• english 
    • español
    • english
    • português (brasil)
  • Login
    • español
    • english
    • português (brasil)
View Item 
  •   Scioteca Home
  • 06. Documentos de trabajo
  • 6.1 Documentos de trabajo en investigación socioeconómica
  • View Item
  •   Scioteca Home
  • 06. Documentos de trabajo
  • 6.1 Documentos de trabajo en investigación socioeconómica
  • View Item
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

Browse

All of Scioteca

Communities & CollectionsBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsCountry / Region

This Collection

By Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsCountry / Region

Profiles

Our authors

My Account

LoginRegister

Kickbacks and limits on campaign donations

Abstract
How do campaign contribution limits alter the influence of donors over elected officials? We propose a model to explore this question and test its implications using data from Colombian municipalities. Using a regression discontinuity design that exploits institutional rules determining contribution limits based on population thresholds, we find that looser campaign limits reduce the number of donors per candidate and increase the average donations received by the winner of the election. Moreover, we document that donors who contributed to the winner of the election are more likely to receive contracts from the supported candidate upon taking office. These patterns suggest that looser campaign limits increase the influence of fewer individuals in campaigns. A higher influence of donors over elected officials is reflected by the fact that looser limits are associated with more kickbacks for each donor, which are awarded in a more discretionary way.
Subject
Democracia | Investigación socioeconómica
 
Country / Region
América Latina y el Caribe
Colombia
 
URI
http://scioteca.caf.com/handle/123456789/1429
Date
2019-03-21
Cite this publication
Belongs to collection
  • 6.1 Documentos de trabajo en investigación socioeconómica
Thumbnail
View/Open
Kickbacks and limits on campaign donations (534.4Kb)
Author
Gulzar, Saad
Rueda, Miguel R.
Ruiz, Nelson A.
Show full item record

Items Relacionados

Thumbnail
Inside the revolving door: campaign finance, lobbying meetings and public contracts. An investigation for Argentina

This paper explores the relationship between political influence activities by interest groups and benefits obtained in the form of public contracts. ...

Thumbnail
RED 2019: Integrity in public policy. Keys to prevent corruption

Corruption has long been installed in Latin America as one of the main concerns of the population. Reasons are not lacking, since the consequences of ...

Thumbnail
Criminal Dominance and Campaign Concentration

There are many journalistic and anecdotal accounts about the prevalence of electoral corrals in Brazil, geographic areas where brokers, politicians, or ...

  • access

    • shareholders' assembly
    • board of directors
    • customers
    • officials
  • employment

    • our people and values
    • corporate internship program
    • professional development program
    • register your resumee
    • current opportunities
    • employment faq
    • ex-post consulting
  • contact us

    • prevention of asset laundering
    • ethics committee
    • contact us
  • in this website

    • knowledge
    • events
    • log
    • news
    • calls
    • terms and conditions
    • site map
  • other websites

    • geosur
    • centro de información y documentación