Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorKronick, Dorothy
dc.coverage.spatialVenezuelaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2015-02-11T00:20:41Z
dc.date.available2015-02-11T00:20:41Z
dc.date.issued2014-05
dc.identifier.citationKronick, D. (2014, May). Electoral Consequences of Violent Crime: Evidence from Venezuela. CAF. Retrieved from http://scioteca.caf.com/handle/123456789/687en
dc.identifier.urihttp://scioteca.caf.com/handle/123456789/687
dc.description.tableofcontentsTo what extent to do voters hold political incumbents accountable for policy outcomes? This paper considers retrospective voting in the context of violent crime. Using a novel panel data set on county -and neighborhood- level homicide incidence and vote shares in Venezuela, I nd that, relative to other policy outcomes such as cash transfers, voters are generally unresponsive to changes in homicide incidence. However, responsiveness varies with the type of election and with the nature of local crime control institutions (which change within municipality over time). Noting the role of external shocks (for example, from drug enforcement activities in neighboring Colombia) in producing violence in Venezuela, I interpret these results as evidence that voters (correctly) view homicide outcomes as weak signals of incumbent political quality. Theresults are therefore consistent with rational retrospective models of voting behavior.EN
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherCAFen_US
dc.rightsCC-BY-NCes_ES
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/es_ES
dc.subjectSeguridad ciudadanaen_US
dc.subjectSeguridaden_US
dc.subjectInvestigación socioeconómicaen_US
dc.titleElectoral Consequences of Violent Crime: Evidence from Venezuelaen_US
dc.typeworkingPaperen_US


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

CC-BY-NC
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as CC-BY-NC