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dc.contributor.authorÁlvarez-Parra, Fernando
dc.contributor.authorBrassiolo, Pablo
dc.contributor.authorFajardo, Gustavo
dc.coverage.spatialAmérica Latina y el Caribees_ES
dc.date.accessioned2022-01-27T16:02:07Z
dc.date.available2022-01-27T16:02:07Z
dc.date.issued2021-12-22
dc.identifier.citationÁlvarez-Parra, F., Brassiolo, P., & Fajardo, G. (2021, December 22). Who attract the public sector compensation schemes?: evidence from Latin America. Caracas: CAF. Retrieved from https://scioteca.caf.com/handle/123456789/1868en_GB
dc.identifier.urihttps://scioteca.caf.com/handle/123456789/1868
dc.description.tableofcontentsCompensation schemes tend to differ markedly between public and private sector jobs, which can affect the relative preferences of potential employees towards those jobs. We explore this through two informational experiments embedded within a large household survey in ten Latin American cities. We focus on two of the most relevant features of compensation schemes: the wage level and the existence of pay-for-performance. We find that the common characteristics of public sector contracts—i.e. flat wages, a negative wage gap with respect to the private sector in the upper end of the distribution, and a low prevalence of payfor- performance rules—diminishes the attractiveness of public employment among high-performing, high-ability individuals.es_ES
dc.language.isoenes_ES
dc.publisherCAFes_ES
dc.subjectDesarrolloes_ES
dc.subjectEconomíaes_ES
dc.subjectInvestigación socioeconómicaes_ES
dc.subjectPolíticas públicases_ES
dc.subjectSector privadoes_ES
dc.subjectSector públicoes_ES
dc.titleWho attract the public sector compensation schemes?: evidence from Latin Americaes_ES
dc.typeworkingPaperes_ES
dc.publisher.cityCaracases_ES


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