Mostrar el registro sencillo del ítem
Inside the revolving door: campaign finance, lobbying meetings and public contracts. An investigation for Argentina
| dc.contributor.author | Freille, S. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Avramovich, C. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Moncarz, P. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Sofietti, P. | |
| dc.coverage.spatial | América Latina y el Caribe | es_ES |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2019-02-25T20:11:40Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2019-02-25T20:11:40Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2019-01-21 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Freille, S., Avramovich, C., Moncarz, P., & Sofietti, P. (2019, January 21). Inside the revolving door: campaign finance, lobbying meetings and public contracts. An investigation for Argentina. Caracas: CAF. Retrieved from https://scioteca.caf.com/handle/123456789/1392 | en_GB |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://scioteca.caf.com/handle/123456789/1392 | |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | This paper explores the relationship between political influence activities by interest groups and benefits obtained in the form of public contracts. We propose an electoral competition model where interest groups make ex-ante campaign contributions to candidates and ex-post lobbying contributions (efforts). Campaign contributions are useful to bias the election result although an aggressive campaign fight encourages interest groups to concentrate in lobbying activities. Using a novel and unique dataset at the individual level, we find that lobbying meetings are positively correlated with public contract amount and the probability of obtaining a contract. This result holds when controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. Campaign contributions are not significantly related to either public contract amount or the probability of winning contracts. | es_ES |
| dc.language.iso | en | es_ES |
| dc.publisher | CAF | es_ES |
| dc.subject | Corrupción | es_ES |
| dc.subject | Democracia | es_ES |
| dc.subject | Investigación socioeconómica | es_ES |
| dc.subject | Transparencia | es_ES |
| dc.title | Inside the revolving door: campaign finance, lobbying meetings and public contracts. An investigation for Argentina | es_ES |
| dc.type | workingPaper | es_ES |
| dc.publisher.city | Caracas | es_ES |
Ficheros en el ítem
Este ítem aparece en la(s) siguiente(s) colección(ones)
-
6.1 Documentos de trabajo en investigación socioeconómica
En esta colección se encuentran los documentos de trabajo sobre temas económicos y sociales prioritarios para la región.
Items Relacionados
Kickbacks and limits on campaign donations
How do campaign contribution limits alter the influence of donors over elected officials? We propose a model to explore this question and test its ...
Estimating the nature of political corruption: evidence from a policy experiment in Brazil
This paper proposes a test to estimate the nature of political corruption in developing countries: embezzlement by self enriching politicians versus ...
Public-Private Partnership in Latin America. Learning from experience
In recent decades, many Latin American countries have launched public-private partnership models for the construction, maintenance and operation of ...