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dc.contributor.authorFreille, S.
dc.contributor.authorAvramovich, C.
dc.contributor.authorMoncarz, P.
dc.contributor.authorSofietti, P.
dc.coverage.spatialAmérica Latina y el Caribees_ES
dc.date.accessioned2019-02-25T20:11:40Z
dc.date.available2019-02-25T20:11:40Z
dc.date.issued2019-01-21
dc.identifier.citationFreille, S., Avramovich, C., Moncarz, P., & Sofietti, P. (2019, January 21). Inside the revolving door: campaign finance, lobbying meetings and public contracts. An investigation for Argentina. Caracas: CAF. Retrieved from http://scioteca.caf.com/handle/123456789/1392en
dc.identifier.urihttp://scioteca.caf.com/handle/123456789/1392
dc.description.tableofcontentsThis paper explores the relationship between political influence activities by interest groups and benefits obtained in the form of public contracts. We propose an electoral competition model where interest groups make ex-ante campaign contributions to candidates and ex-post lobbying contributions (efforts). Campaign contributions are useful to bias the election result although an aggressive campaign fight encourages interest groups to concentrate in lobbying activities. Using a novel and unique dataset at the individual level, we find that lobbying meetings are positively correlated with public contract amount and the probability of obtaining a contract. This result holds when controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. Campaign contributions are not significantly related to either public contract amount or the probability of winning contracts.es_ES
dc.language.isoenes_ES
dc.publisherCAFes_ES
dc.subjectCorrupciónes_ES
dc.subjectDemocraciaes_ES
dc.subjectInvestigación socioeconómicaes_ES
dc.subjectTransparenciaes_ES
dc.titleInside the revolving door: campaign finance, lobbying meetings and public contracts. An investigation for Argentinaes_ES
dc.typeworkingPaperes_ES
dc.publisher.cityCaracases_ES


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