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dc.contributor.authorVargas, Juan
dc.contributor.authorVillaveces, Marta-Juanita
dc.coverage.spatialColombiaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-09-27T14:55:38Z
dc.date.available2016-09-27T14:55:38Z
dc.date.issued2016-09-21
dc.identifier.citationVargas, J. F., & Villaveces, M.-J. (2016, September 21). Rural Property Tax Revenue in the Face of Economic Concentration and Political Competition: Evidence from Colombia. CAF–Working paper;N° 2016/05, Caracas: CAF. Retrieved from http://scioteca.caf.com/handle/123456789/945en
dc.identifier.urihttp://scioteca.caf.com/handle/123456789/945
dc.description.tableofcontentsWe study the relationship between two sources of political power and property tax revenues in contemporary rural Colombia. First, de jure political power is the extent to which local political elites can capture the public administration for their own benefit. Second, de facto political power is the extent to which economically powerful landowners can influence policy. Using a panel of municipalities, we show that places with either high economic or high political concentration raise more taxes, but places with both high political and economic concentration perform worse.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherCAFen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCAF–Working paper;N° 2016/05
dc.rightsCC-BY-NCes_ES
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/es_ES
dc.subjectDesarrollo ruralen_US
dc.subjectImpuestosen_US
dc.subjectInvestigación socioeconómicaen_US
dc.titleRural Property Tax Revenue in the Face of Economic Concentration and Political Competition: Evidence from Colombiaen_US
dc.typeworkingPaperen_US
dc.publisher.cityCaracasen_US


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