Now showing items 1-6 of 6
Corruption, Custom Reform and Firm Growth: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Colombia
Customs are often prone to corruption because it concentrates a lot of discretionary power in the hand of custom agents who take decisions with high economic stakes for the firms, providing an opportunity for custom agents ...
Inside the revolving door: campaign finance, lobbying meetings and public contracts. An investigation for Argentina
This paper explores the relationship between political influence activities by interest groups and benefits obtained in the form of public contracts. We propose an electoral competition model where interest groups make ...
Criminal Dominance and Campaign Concentration
There are many journalistic and anecdotal accounts about the prevalence of electoral corrals in Brazil, geographic areas where brokers, politicians, or community leaders influence residents to vote for a specific candidate. ...
Estimating the nature of political corruption: evidence from a policy experiment in Brazil
This paper proposes a test to estimate the nature of political corruption in developing countries: embezzlement by self enriching politicians versus corruption that originates as a quid-pro-quo from campaign contributions. ...
Government transparency and political clientelism: Evidence from randomized anti-corruption audits in Brazil
Political clientelism is considered a fundamental reason why politicians are not accountable and responsive to their constituencies. In this working paper, we study whether transparency initiatives – more specifically, ...
Self-Selection into Corruption: Evidence from the Lab
We study whether the existence of opportunities to extract rents in a job affects the type of individuals who are attracted to it. We design a laboratory experiment in which individuals choose between two contracts, each ...