Now showing items 1-2 of 2

    • Education, Signaling and Mismatch 

      Arozamena, Leandro; Ruffo, Hernán (CAF; Buenos Aires, 2016-06)
      We assess the importance education as a signal of workers skills and the e¤ects of poor signaling quality on labor market outcomes. We do so by merging a frictional labor market model with a signaling setup where there is ...
    • Education, signaling and the allocation of entrepreneurial skills 

      Arozamena, Leandro; Ruffo, Hernán (CAF; Buenos Aires, 2017-10-02)
      We assess the allocative importance of education when workers can choose to self-employ. To do so, we build a model combining educational choices with the labor market and selfemployment. Education can increase workers' ...