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Decentralizing Development: Evidence from Government Splits

dc.contributor.authorDahis, Ricardo
dc.contributor.authorSzerman, Christiane
dc.coverage.spatialAmérica Latina y el Caribees_ES
dc.date.accessioned2024-09-27T20:45:34Z
dc.date.available2024-09-27T20:45:34Z
dc.date.issued2024-07
dc.identifier.citationDahis, R., & Szerman, C. (2024, July). Decentralizing Development: Evidence from Government Splits. Retrieved from https://scioteca.caf.com/handle/123456789/2297en_GB
dc.identifier.urihttps://scioteca.caf.com/handle/123456789/2297
dc.description.tableofcontentsChanges in political boundaries aimed at devolving power to local governments are common in many countries. We examine the economic consequences of redistricting through the creation of smaller government units. Exploiting reforms that led to sharp variations in the number of government units in Brazil, we show that voluntary redistricting increases the size of the public sector, public services delivery, and economic activity in new local governments over the long term. The gains in economic activity are not offset by losses elsewhere and are stronger in peripheral and remote backward areas neglected by their parent governments. We provide evidence that decentralizing decision-making power boosts local development in disadvantaged areas beyond simply gains in fiscal revenues.es_ES
dc.language.isoenes_ES
dc.rightsCC-BY-NC-NDes_ES
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/es_ES
dc.subjectDesarrolloes_ES
dc.subjectEconomíaes_ES
dc.subjectGobernabilidades_ES
dc.titleDecentralizing Development: Evidence from Government Splitses_ES
dc.typeArticlees_ES


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