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dc.contributor.authorAlzúa, María Lauraes
dc.identifier.citationAlzúa, M. L. (2011). Workfare and crime: evidence for Argentina. CAF Working paper, 2011/05, Caracas: CAF. Retrieved from
dc.description.tableofcontentsThis paper investigates the effect of introducing a massive workfare program on property crimes. In order to circumvent the endogeneity problem common to joint factors determining crime and demand for workfare we make use of instrumental variables. We exploit two special features. First, the program was assigned according to political criteria which were trying to attract provinces and/or counties who were aligned with the national government. Second, the program was grant in mid-2002 and closed afterwards, so there were no new-comers to the program. We use political affiliation of different level of governments as instrument for the number of workfare programs per capita and find that the program reduced property crime but had no effect on other kinds of crime. The paper represents a contribution to the crime literature, since this issue has not been explored. If workfare programs have an effect on crime, then the welfare effect is different from the one often calculated in the literature.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCAF Working paper, 2011/05es
dc.subjectDesarrollo sociales
dc.subjectPolíticas públicases
dc.subjectInvestigación socioeconómicaes
dc.subjectTrabajo y protección sociales
dc.titleWorkfare and crime: evidence for Argentinaes

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