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dc.contributor.authorBrassiolo, Pablo
dc.contributor.authorEstrada, Ricardo
dc.contributor.authorFajardo, Gustavo
dc.contributor.authorMartínez-Correa, Julian
dc.coverage.spatialAmérica Latina y el Caribees_ES
dc.coverage.spatialMéxicoes_ES
dc.date.accessioned2021-10-19T21:32:09Z
dc.date.available2021-10-19T21:32:09Z
dc.date.issued2021-10-19
dc.identifier.citationBrassiolo, P., Estrada, R., Fajardo, G., & Martínez-Correa, J. (2021, October 19). Family Rules: Nepotism in the Mexican Judiciary. Caracas: CAF. Retrieved from https://scioteca.caf.com/handle/123456789/1798en_GB
dc.identifier.urihttps://scioteca.caf.com/handle/123456789/1798
dc.description.tableofcontentsWe show that bureaucrats can exploit discretion in hiring decisions to engage in forms of favoritism that hinder organizational performance. We do this in the context of the Mexican federal judiciary. The arrival of a judge at a circuit results in the hiring of 0.05 relatives to key staff positions within the following year on average, a figure which is probably a lower bound of the overall effect. Moreover, we find that the appointment of relatives of judges to a court’s staff leads to a reduction in the court’s productivity, which indicates that such hires are motivated by rent-seeking rather than by efficiency purposes. Importantly for personnel policy, nepotistic hires are concentrated among judges who have been sanctioned for administrative offenses, those assigned to courts located in their state of birth, and those in higher-ranking positions.es_ES
dc.language.isoenes_ES
dc.publisherCAFes_ES
dc.subjectFamiliaes_ES
dc.subjectJusticiaes_ES
dc.subjectProductividades_ES
dc.titleFamily Rules: Nepotism in the Mexican Judiciaryes_ES
dc.typeworkingPaperes_ES
dc.publisher.cityCaracases_ES


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