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Self-Selection into Corruption: Evidence from the Lab

dc.contributor.authorBrassiolo, Pablo
dc.contributor.authorEstrada, Ricardo
dc.contributor.authorFajardo, Gustavo
dc.contributor.authorVargas, Juan
dc.coverage.spatialAmérica Latina y el Caribees_ES
dc.date.accessioned2020-05-08T20:57:36Z
dc.date.available2020-05-08T20:57:36Z
dc.date.issued2020-04-22
dc.identifier.citationBrassiolo, P., Estrada, R., Fajardo, G., & Vargas, J. (2020, April 22). Self-Selection into Corruption: Evidence from the Lab. Caracas: CAF. Retrieved from https://scioteca.caf.com/handle/123456789/1567en_GB
dc.identifier.urihttps://scioteca.caf.com/handle/123456789/1567
dc.description.tableofcontentsWe study whether the existence of opportunities to extract rents in a job affects the type of individuals who are attracted to it. We design a laboratory experiment in which individuals choose between two contracts, each offering a payment in return for performing a task, and we experimentally introduce the possibility of graft in one of the contracts. First, we find that the corruptible contract attracts less honest individuals and repels the more honest ones, thus changing the composition of the group that chooses that contract to the detriment of integrity. Second, we observe extensive graft when the opportunity is introduced. Using a double randomization strategy to disentangle pure incentives and selection effects, we find that selection is the fundamental driver of graft in our context.es_ES
dc.language.isoen_USes_ES
dc.publisherCAFes_ES
dc.subjectCorrupciónes_ES
dc.titleSelf-Selection into Corruption: Evidence from the Labes_ES
dc.typeworkingPaperes_ES
dc.publisher.cityCaracases_ES


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