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dc.contributor.authorBrassiolo, Pablo
dc.contributor.authorEstrada, Ricardo
dc.contributor.authorFajardo, Gustavo
dc.coverage.spatialAmérica Latina y el Caribees_ES
dc.coverage.spatialEcuadores_ES
dc.date.accessioned2020-01-21T14:19:50Z
dc.date.available2020-01-21T14:19:50Z
dc.date.issued2020-01-17
dc.identifier.citationBrassiolo, P., Estrada, R., & Fajardo, G. (2020, January 17). My (Running) Mate, the Mayor: Political Ties and Access to Public Jobs in Ecuador. Caracas: CAF. Retrieved from http://scioteca.caf.com/handle/123456789/1521en
dc.identifier.urihttp://scioteca.caf.com/handle/123456789/1521
dc.description.tableofcontentsWe show that local politicians’ probability of being employed by a municipality increases when they have a strong party connection to its mayor. Using a regression discontinuity design, we compare the employment outcomes of individuals connected to the winner vis-à-vis those connected to the runner-up in close mayoral races in Ecuador. Among candidates to local councils who lose their bid, the probability of getting a job in the municipality increases tenfold when their own party’s mayoral nominee is elected. Importantly, the effect is concentrated among low-ranking positions, which reveals that this is the result of political patronage.es_ES
dc.language.isoenes_ES
dc.publisherCAFes_ES
dc.subjectDemocraciaes_ES
dc.subjectGobernabilidades_ES
dc.subjectPolíticas públicases_ES
dc.titleMy (Running) Mate, the Mayor: Political Ties and Access to Public Jobs in Ecuadores_ES
dc.typeworkingPaperes_ES
dc.publisher.cityCaracases_ES


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