Mostrar el registro sencillo del ítem

Financial Frictions, Occupational Choice and Economic Inequality

dc.contributor.authorAllub, Lian
dc.contributor.authorErosa, Andrés
dc.coverage.spatialBrasiles_ES
dc.date.accessioned2017-04-04T21:34:46Z
dc.date.available2017-04-04T21:34:46Z
dc.date.issued2012-12-10
dc.identifier.citationAllub, L., & Erosa, A. (2012, December 10). Financial Frictions, Occupational Choice and Economic Inequality. CAF – Working paper;N° 2012/15, Caracas: CAF. Retrieved from https://scioteca.caf.com/handle/123456789/1024en_GB
dc.identifier.urihttps://scioteca.caf.com/handle/123456789/1024
dc.description.tableofcontentsWe develop a quantitative theory of entrepreneurship, income inequality, and financial frictions disciplined with household data from Brazil. The theory extends Lucas (1978) by modeling heterogeneity in two skills: -working and managerial skills. Consistently with the evidence, the theory implies three occupational categories: workers, employers, and self-employed entrepreneurs. We find that the correlation between working and managerial skills matters importantly for the distribution of earnings across occupations and for the quantitative implications of financial frictions. We also find that while most households benefit from a reform that eliminates enforcement problems, the majority of employers (about two thirds) lose from the reform. By depressing the demand for labor, limited enforcement depresses the equilibrium wage rate, increasing the profits of employers. Our theory thus suggests that employers in Brazil may have a vested interested in maintaining a status quo with low enforcement.es_ES
dc.language.isoen_USes_ES
dc.publisherCAFes_ES
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCAF – Working paper;N° 2012/15
dc.rightsCC-BY-NCes_ES
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/es_ES
dc.subjectEconomíaes_ES
dc.subjectInvestigación socioeconómicaes_ES
dc.titleFinancial Frictions, Occupational Choice and Economic Inequalityes_ES
dc.typeworkingPaperes_ES
dc.publisher.cityCaracases_ES


Ficheros en el ítem

Thumbnail
Nombre:
Allub & Erosa (2012).pdf
Tamaño:
969.3Kb
Formato:
PDF
Descargar

Este ítem aparece en la(s) siguiente(s) colección(ones)

Mostrar el registro sencillo del ítem

CC-BY-NC
Excepto si se señala otra cosa, la licencia del ítem se describe como CC-BY-NC